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IAbstract
We propose new dynamic models for the dependence structure of high-dimensional finan-
cial data. The models are based on recently proposed factor copula models, which we
augment with regime-switching dynamics. We apply the proposed models to a data set of
eight major European government debt indices and a Euro Area financial sector index to
study government debt systemic risk for the financial sector. As a systemic risk measure
we employ a multivariate extension of the CoVaR measure, which takes distress spillovers
among government debt markets into account and which we characterize through cop-
ulas. We find that a model with multiple skewed and asymmetric common factors and
regime-switching dynamics is able to describe the time-variation and non-normal features
of the dependence structure of our data well. Our results show a distinct difference in
Euro Area government debt systemic risk prior to the financial crisis and thereafter, in-
duced by a regime change in the dependence structure. We find that at the height of the
financial crisis the government debt markets of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain
become positively dependent with the financial sector and imply positive systemic risk,
whereas the government debt markets of Germany, France and the Netherlands continue
to imply negative systemic risk. The total systemic risk, implied by joint distress of all
eight debt markets, is highest shortly after the Lehman brothers default and peaks again
in the second half of 2011.
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1 Introduction
How does distress in sovereign debt markets impact on the financial sector in the Euro
Area? With the onset of the global financial crisis, and even more during the European
debt crisis, this has become a key question to decision makers. Clearly, when banks hold
substantial amounts of government debt on their portfolios distress in these markets poses
a threat to financial stability. That is, distress in government debt markets is a potential
source of systemic risk. Here we measure the systemic risk implied by major Euro Area
sovereign debt markets for the Euro Area financial sector throughout the global financial
and European debt crisis.
Quantifying systemic risk in this context requires measuring the tail risk interde-
pendence of government debt markets and the financial sector. One systemic risk measure
that has been proposed in this context is the CoVaR measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2008). CoVaR captures tail risk interdependence through the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of a
financial institution1 conditional on another institution being in distress. An institution's
systemic risk contribution, its ∆CoVaR, is measured as the difference of the CoVaR when
this institution is in distress and the CoVaR when it is in a state corresponding to normal
conditions. In the context of sovereign debt systemic risk we are interested in the VaR
of the financial sector conditional on distress in sovereign debt markets. See Bisias et al.
(2012) for a survey of CoVaR and alternative systemic risk measures.
One insight from the European debt crisis is how investor concerns with Greek
government debt quickly spread to other countries such as Portugal. That is, we ob-
served how multiple government debt markets across Europe became distressed at the
same time. In fact, contemporaneous distress of multiple financial institutions is one of
the most distinct features of recent financial crisis. However, measuring the systemic risk
impact of an institution by considering isolated distress of this institution does not ac-
count for the propagation of distress through other institutions being in distress at the
same time. In order to account for distress spillovers among multiple financial institutions
when assessing their systemic risk contribution, Cao (2013) proposes to extend the CoVaR
measure to account for distress of multiple institutions. More specifically, Multi-CoVaR is
1Financial institution here is meant in a wider sense than just single financial intermediaries, including
markets, sectors, groups of financial intermediaries or whole financial systems.
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defined as the VaR of the financial system conditional on distress of multiple institutions,
which allows for a more detailed analysis of the systemic risk associated with groups of
institutions. The systemic risk contribution of a given group of financial institutions in
the Multi-CoVaR framework is computed as the difference of Multi-CoVaR when these
institutions are in distress and Multi-CoVaR when these institutions are in a state corre-
sponding to normal conditions.
In the Multi-CoVaR framework the total systemic risk is obtained when all insti-
tutions are in distress jointly. In order to obtain individual systemic risk contributions
in the Multi-CoVaR framework, we allocate the total systemic risk among the individ-
ual financial institutions employing Shapley value methodology (Shapley (1953)), which
has originally been proposed in game theory to share the total wealth or cost of a game
among the participating players. Shapley value methodology has recently been employed
for systemic risk attribution by Tarashev et al. (2010), Cao (2013) and Bernardi et al.
(2014). The resulting systemic risk allocation is efficient. That is, the sum of the indi-
vidual systemic risk contributions equals the total systemic risk. The individual systemic
risk contributions obtained through the Shapley value methodology equals the ∆CoVaR
of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) when the risks of all institutions are orthogonal.
We characterize the Multi-CoVaR systemic risk measure through copulas. Any
joint distribution can be decomposed into a copula, which exclusively contains all infor-
mation about the dependence structure, and marginal distributions. This decomposition
provides advantages over working with the joint distribution directly. First, it allows for
the construction of very flexible joint distributions by combining arbitrary models for
marginal distributions and copulas. Second, it facilitates multi-stage estimation, which
can distinctly reduce the computational burden and is therefore particularly useful when
working in high dimensions.
Copulas are particularly suited to describe the non-normal features often found
in the dependence structure of financial assets such as tail dependence, that is, the de-
pendence of joint extreme events, and an asymmetric dependence structure, with joint
crashes being more likely than joint booms. Accounting for these features is crucial in the
CoVaR context, given that CoVaR is based on tail risk interdependence.
We obtain copula based Multi-CoVaR through a procedure similar to Reboredo and
Ugolini (2015a), which we extend to multivariate dimensions. Most notably, this proce-
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dure does not require computation of the individual VaR of an institution but only the
nominal level, which is a distinct computational advantage of copulas over multivariate
time-series models in the Multi-CoVaR context.
Whereas there is a large number of applications and suitable copula models for two
dimensions, suitable copula models for higher dimensions that go beyond copulas implied
by elliptical distributions, such as the Gaussian or t copula, or multivariate Archimedian
copulas have emerged only recently. Here we employ the class of factor copulas of Oh and
Patton (2015). Factor copulas can be understood as copulas implied by factor models,
therefore providing a potential dimension reduction, which is crucial when working in
high dimension. The difference to factor models arises because marginal distributions are
not affected by the factor structure, but modeled separately. Thus the dimension reduc-
tion is only applied to the copula, where it is crucial, and flexibility for the margins is
retained. The properties of the factor copula depend on the distributions for the common
factors and idiosyncratic shocks. Combining a fat tailed and skewed common factor with
symmetric idiosyncratic shocks leads to a copula with tail dependence and an asymmetric
dependence structure. Factor copulas are scalable, that is, a further dimension reduction
can be achieved by placing meaningful and testable restrictions on the parameters.
The dependence structure of financial assets is often characterized by substan-
tial time variation (Longin and Solnik (1995), Engle (2002), Rodriguez (2007)). Here
we employ Markov-switching dynamics in order to allow for time-varying dependence.
In Markov-switching models the data generating process is assumed to switch between
several regimes according to a hidden state variable (Hamilton (1989)), where typically
changes of the state are associated with changes in part or all of the model parameters.
Markov-switching models allow for sudden changes in regimes that can persist for ex-
tended periods of time, thereby closely describing the behavior of financial markets.
When Markov-switching is applied in the context of copulas, not only the copula pa-
rameters can be allowed to change through time but, through different copula densities in
the different regimes, also the structural characteristics of the dependence such as tail de-
pendence and asymmetric dependence could change. By introducing a Markov-switching
factor copula we add to the literature on dynamic high-dimensional copula models for
financial data.
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We analyze sovereign debt systemic risk for the general Euro Area financial sector
of eight Euro Area sovereign debt markets, three core countries (Germany, France and the
Netherlands) and the five PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
over the period May 2005 to April 2016 using weekly returns on ten year benchmark
government bond indices and a broad Euro Area financial sector index.
Our work is closely related to Reboredo and Ugolini (2015b), who investigate Euro
Area sovereign debt systemic risk for individual financial systems using a vine-copula Co-
VaR approach. They work with a conditioning event including the return on domestic
government debt as well as Greek government debt, thereby taking into account depen-
dence between the Greek sovereign debt market and the sovereign and financial systems
of other countries. Their approach allows them to analyze the impact of distress in Greek
government debt on financial systems of other countries while also taking into account
the domestic sovereign debt markets of these countries. We focus instead on the sovereign
debt systemic risk for the general Euro Area financial sector implied by eight major gov-
ernment debt markets, while taking spillovers among these markets into account.
Our results show a distinct difference in Euro Area government debt systemic risk
prior to the financial crisis and thereafter. We find that, until the height of the global
financial crisis all eight government debt markets are characterized by strong positive
dependence and are negatively dependent with the Euro Area financial sector. The sys-
temic risk implied by all sovereign debt markets, while accounting for distress spillovers
among these markets, over this period is similar and negative in a sense that distress in
government debt markets decreased financial sector VaR. This finding can be interpreted
in terms of a diversification benefit of government bonds on bank portfolios. The total
systemic risk, obtained from joint distress of all eight debt markets, is negative over this
period.
At the height of the global financial crisis, with the Lehman Brothers default, we
observe a regime shift and the government debt markets decouple. The debt markets of
the three core countries remain stable and strongly dependent with each other, whereas
the government bond indices of the PIIGS countries show heightened volatility and an
increase in yield, reflecting investor concerns with these markets. PIIGS government debt
markets become positively dependent with the Euro Area financial sector. Importantly,
these markets now imply positive systemic risk, in a sense that distress of these mar-
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kets increases financial sector VaR. Systemic risk of these markets is highest shortly after
the Lehman Brothers default and increased again in the second half of 2011. The debt
markets of the core countries remain negatively dependent with the financial sector and
continue to imply negative systemic risk. Total government debt systemic risk becomes
positive with the Lehman Default, meaning that joint distress of all eight government
debt markets increases financial sector VaR. Tail dependence is an important feature of
the dependence structure of our data throughout the sample period.
The remainder is organized in five chapters: In chapter two we introduce Markov-
switching factor copulas. We first present some basic copula theory and dependence
measures, before we explain factor copulas in more detail and show how we model depen-
dence dynamics through Markov-switching in the context of factor copulas. In chapter
three we elaborate on the estimation of Markov-switching factor copulas. We first show
how the log-likelihood can be obtained and define the estimator. We then describe how
we obtained standard errors. Finally, a numerical integration method to obtain the factor
copula density is described. In the fourth chapter we present our systemic risk measures.
First, we recall the CoVaR measures. We then move on to presenting Multi-CoVaR, a
multivariate extension, and characterize it using copulas. Finally, we state how we obtain
total systemic risk and efficient individual systemic risk contributions in the Multi-CoVaR
framework. In chapter five we present our results. We begin with a short description of
the data and show estimation results for univariate models. We then present estima-
tion results from different factor-copula models. Finally, we present our government debt
systemic risk risk results. In chapter six we conclude.
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2 Markov-switching factor copulas
We begin this chapter with an introduction of some basic copula theory and some de-
pendence measures. We then present factor copulas. Finally, we present the concept of
Markov-switching dynamics and formalize it in the context of factor copulas.
2.1 Basic copula theory
Consider a d-variate stochastic process {Y }nt=1 with Yt = (y1,t, ..., yd,t). Let F (y1,t, ..., yd,t)
denote the joint distribution and let Fi and fi denote the marginal distribution and density
function of yi,t, respectively. From Sklar (1959) it follows that F can be decomposed into
d marginal distributions and a copula C : [0, 1]d → [0, 1], which completely contains all
the information about the dependence structure, such that:
F (Yt) = C (F1(y1,t), ..., Fd(yd,t)) (1)
The copula can therefore be understood as a multivariate distribution function that com-
bines the marginal distributions F1, ..., Fn to the joint distribution F . The decomposition
offered through Sklar's Theorem is useful for several reasons: First, given univariate dis-
tributions F1, ..., Fd and copula C one can construct a valid joint distribution F with
marginal distributions F1, ..., Fd, a finding that allows constructing very flexible joint dis-
tributions. Here we focus on new dynamic models for C and draw on existing models
for the marginal distributions. Second, Sklar's theorem facilitates multi-stage estimation,
which is particularly useful in high-dimensional applications because it distinctly reduces
the computational burden. We assume that the marginal distributions are continuous
and can be modeled parametrically2. The probability integral transform (PIT) is then
given by ui,t = Fi(yi,t; θm,i), where θm,i is a vector containing all parameters describing
margin i and we define θm = (θ
′
m,1, ..., θ
′
m,n)
′ as the vector of all marginal parameters. The
variable ui,t follows a Uniform(0, 1) distribution regardless of Fi, thus the copula can
be understood as a joint distribution with Uniform(0, 1) margins. The marginal distri-
bution Fi(yi,t; θm,i) can be a conditional distribution and in the empirical application we
model yi,t using an ARMA-GARCH model and treat the resulting residuals as iid ran-
2This assumption arises because there is no asymptotic theory for models with nonparametric margins
as in Chen and Fan (2006) and a dynamic copula.
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dom variables. We also assume that the copula is parametric (and absolutely continuous),
equation (1) can then be expressed in terms of densities:
f(Yt) =
d∏
i=1
fi(yi,t) · c (u1,t, ..., ud,t) (2)
where c(u1,t, ..., ud,t) =
∂n
∂u1,t,...,∂ud,t
C(u1,t, ..., ud,t) denotes the copula density and f is the
joint density of Yt. This expression makes clear why the copula exclusively contains all
the information about the dependence structure, because on the right hand side only
marginal densities appear in addition to the copula density.
2.2 Dependence measures
We now turn to the explanation of the dependence measures that are used throughout the
following analysis. For a detailed discussion of dependence measures see Nelsen (2006) or
Patton (2013). First, note that linear correlation is not a suitable measure in the context
of copulas. One reason is that it is not scale invariant, and is thus affected by strictly
increasing transformations of the data. This means the linear correlation of the data and
the PIT can be different, for instance. Linear correlation is thus affected by the marginal
distributions and not just a function of the copula, an undesirable property when working
with copulas. The dependence measures introduced below are functions of the copula
only. Throughout the following consider two random variables yi,t and yj,t with marginal
distributions Fi and Fj, respectively, and copula C.
Spearman's rank correlation measures the relationship between two variables
using their concordance and discordance. It can also be understood as the linear cor-
relation of the ranks of the data. Rank correlation can be expressed in terms of the
copula:
ρ = Corr(ui,t, uj,t) = 12 E(ui,tuj,t)− 3 (3)
= 12
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
uvdC(u, v)− 3 (4)
= 12
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
C(u, v)dudv − 3 (5)
We have used that E(u) = 1/2 and V(u) = 1/12 for u ∼ Uniform(0, 1). We can estimate
rank correlation as:
ρ̂ =
12
n
n∑
t=1
ui,tuj,t − 3 (6)
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Rank correlation lies in the interval [-1,1] and can therefore provide information on the
sign of dependence.
Quantile dependence measures the dependence of two random variables in the
joint tails. For quantile q it is defined as:
τq =
P(ui,t ≤ q|uj,t ≤ q), q ∈ (0, 0.5]P(ui,t > q|uj,t > q), q ∈ (0.5, 1) (7)
=

C(q,q)
q
, q ∈ (0, 0.5]
1−2q−C(q,q)
1−q , q ∈ (0.5, 1)
(8)
Quantile dependence can thus be understood as the conditional probability of observing
a realization of one variable in the q-th quantile, given that such an observation has been
made for the other variable3. Quantile dependence can be estimated as:
τ̂q =

1
nq
∑n
t=1 I {ui,t ≤ q, uj,t ≤ q} , q ∈ (0, 0.5]
1
n(1−q)
∑n
t=1 I {ui,t > q, uj,t > q} , q ∈ (0.5, 1)
(10)
where I denotes the indicator function. Quantile dependence lies in the interval [0,1].
When comparing quantile dependence for the lower and upper tail we can gain insights
into the symmetry of the dependence structure.
Tail dependence is defined as the limit of quantile dependence for q ↓ 0 or q ↑ 1:
τL = lim
q↓0
P(ui,t ≤ q|uj,t ≤ q) = lim
q↓0
C(q, q)
q
(11)
τU = lim
q↑1
P(ui,t > q|uj,t > q) = lim
q↑1
1− 2q − C(q, q)
1− q (12)
Tail dependence can thus be understood as the dependence between extreme events. Note
that sample tail dependence cannot simply be taken as the limit of equation (10), because
this is zero for q being close to the respective boundary. However, for a number of copulas
tail dependence is available in closed form, see e.g. Nelsen (2006).
3For negatively dependent variables we focus on the counter diagonal, quantile dependence in this case
is defined as:
τq =

q−C(1−q,q)
q , q ∈ (0, 0.5]
q−C(q,1−q)
1−q , q ∈ (0.5, 1)
(9)
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2.3 Factor copulas
Factor models are commonly used in various disciplines such as economics, finance or
statistics to achieve a dimension reduction by summarizing a potentially large number of
variables by a smaller number of common factors. The class of factor copulas is introduced
by Oh and Patton (2015) and can be understood as copulas generated from a factor model
based on latent variables, making them particularly suitable for high-dimensional depen-
dence modeling because of the dimension reduction offered through the factor structure.
A simple factor model with one common factor for X = (x1, . . . , xd), which is based on
d+ 1 latent variables, is:
xi = βiz + εi, i = 1, 2, ..., d
z ∼ Fz(γz), εi ∼ iid Fε(γε), z ⊥ εi ∀i
(x1, ..., xd) = X ∼ Fx(γc) = C(G1(γc), ..., Gd(γc); γc)
(13)
where γc = (β1, ..., βd, γ
′
z, γ
′
ε)
′ denotes the vector of factor copula parameters, z is the latent
common factor with distribution Fz, εi is a latent idiosyncratic shock with distribution Fε
and Gi denotes the marginal distribution of xi. The central idea behind factor copulas is to
use the above structure exclusively for the copula of Y , C(Y ). The marginal distributions
of Y are modeled and estimated separately, so Fi does not equal Gi in general. If this
assumption is relaxed and margins are modeled jointly with the copula equation (13)
becomes a standard factor model with latent factors. However, Oh and Patton (2015)
suggest to apply the potential dimension reduction offered through the factor structure
only to the copula, where it is crucial, and retain flexibility for the margins. The copula
C is in general not known in closed form. One exemption is with Normal distributions for
Fz and Fε, because this results in a multivariate Normal distribution for X, the copula is
thus Gaussian with a correlation matrix implied by the factor structure. The properties
of C depend on the choices for Fz and Fε. Choosing the common factor to come from a fat
tailed distribution (with at least as fat tails as the distribution for the idiosyncratic shock)
allows for tail dependence, whereas combining an asymmetric distribution for the common
factor with a symmetric distribution for the idiosyncratic shock leads to an asymmetric
dependence structure.
The Skewt t − t factor copula has been found by Oh and Patton (2015) and Oh
and Patton (2016) to be a good choice for financial data. It is obtained by choosing the
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Skew t distribution of Hansen (1994) for Fz and the t distribution (standardized to have
unit variance) for Fε. We now explain the Skew t distribution in more detail. First we
state the density function:
g(z|ν, λ) =

bc
(
1 +
1
ν − 2
(
bz + a
1− λ
)2)−(ν+1)/2
z < −a/b
bc
(
1 +
1
ν − 2
(
bz + a
1 + λ
)2)−(ν+1)/2
z ≥ −a/b
(14)
with
a = 4λc
(
ν − 2
ν − 1
)
, b2 = 1 + 3λ2 − a2, c = Γ(
ν+1
2
)√
pi(ν − 2)Γ(ν
2
)
(15)
and Γ denotes the gamma function. The Skew t distribution has zero mean and a variance
of one. The degree of freedom parameter ν ∈ (2,∞) determines the fatness of the tails
and λ ∈ (−1, 1) is a skewness parameter. The density is negatively skewed for λ < 0,
it displays positive skewness for λ > 0 and for λ = 0 it is symmetric. For λ = 0 and
ν 6= +∞ the skew t distribution corresponds to the t distribution, for λ 6= 0 and ν = +∞
it corresponds to a skewed Normal distribution and for λ = 0 and ν = +∞ it corresponds
to the Normal distribution. For the standardized t-distribution that is employed for Fε
we choose the same degree of freedom parameter as for the common factor for simplicity.
The t distribution corresponds to a Normal distribution for ν = +∞. A Skew t− t factor
copula with a structure as in equation (13) and equal degree of freedom parameters for
Fz and Fε thus has d + 2 parameters in total - d factor loadings, one degree of freedom
parameter, ν, and one skewness parameter, λ.
The Skewt t − t factor copula nests a number of other factor copulas. Following
the discussion of the involved distributions above, for ν = +∞ and λ 6= 0 it becomes the
Skew N - N factor copula with no tail dependence but asymmetric dependence. If λ = 0
and ν 6= +∞ the Skew t− t factor copula becomes a t - t factor copula, which allows for
tail dependence but imposes a symmetric dependence structure. If λ = 0 and ν = +∞
the Skewt t− t factor copula becomes the Normal factor copula, which corresponds to a
Gaussian copula with correlation matrix implied by the factor structure.
We illustrate different factor copulas in figure 1. To this end we present 1000
simulations from bivariate distributions, constructed using the four different factor copulas
discussed above. All plots have N(0, 1) marginal distributions and a linear correlation
2.3 Factor copulas 11
Figure 1: This figure presents scatter plots from four bivariate distributions,
all obtained from different factor copulas. All plots have N(0, 1) margins and
a linear correlation of 0.5.
of 0.5. The plot based on the Normal factor copula, which is obtained by setting Fz =
N(0, 1) and Fε = N(0, 1), shows a symmetric dependence structure and compared to the
plot based on the t - t factor copula, no observations in the joint tails. The two plots
based on skewed distributions for the common shock display a distinct asymmetry in the
dependence structure. A comparison of the plot based on the Skew N −N factor copula
to the plot based on the Skewt t− t factor copula reveals a distinct difference in the joint
tails. The plots are obtained with ν = 4 and λ = −0.5.
The model in equation (13) can be extended to include multiple common factors in
order to allow for a more flexible dependence structure:
xi =
k∑
j=1
βi,jzj + εi, i = 1, 2, . . . , d (16)
εi ∼ iid Fε(γε), zj ∼ iid Fz(γz), zj ⊥ εi ∀ i, j (17)
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The common factors need to be independent in order to obtain the copula pdf through
the numerical integration procedure described in section 3.3 and we assume them to be
identically distributed with equal parameters for simplicity and to reduce the number of
parameters in the numerical optimization procedure.
Simulation is required to obtain properties such as rank correlations and quantile
dependence for most factor copulas. However, Oh and Patton (2015) derive tail depen-
dence properties of linear factor copulas, in particular for the Skew t − t factor copula,
in closed form.
2.4 Modeling dependence dynamics through Markov-switching
There is ample evidence that the dependence structure of financial assets, much as finan-
cial asset volatility, changes through time. This has first been demonstrated for correla-
tions (Longin and Solnik (1995), Engle (2002)). In particular, there has been a debate
if financial asset correlations increase during volatile periods, especially when these are
characterized by large negative returns (Longin and Solnik (2001), Ang and Chen (2002),
Cappielo et al. (2006)). Given that copulas allow for modeling more general features
of the dependence structure than just linear correlation, modeling dependence dynam-
ics through time-varying copulas has attracted a number of researchers, beginning with
Patton (2006b) who extends Sklar's theorem to conditional distributions. A survey on
time-varying copulas can be found in Manner and Reznikova (2012).
Some of the modeling approaches proposed in the time-varying copula literature
are suitable for multivariate applications, including Markov-switching. Markov-switching
copula models assume different copulas, or a least different copula parameters, in different
regimes between which the the data generating process can switch. Thereby they allow for
sudden and potentially recurrent changes in the dependence structure of financial assets,
for instance arising from financial crisis, but also for permanent changes such as due to
increasing financial integration. We now formalize the concept of Markov-switching in
the context of factor copulas.
As in Hamilton (1989) we assume that Yt depends on a latent state variable
St ∈ (1, 2), which determines the regime (or state). We allow St to affect the depen-
dence structure, but not the marginal distributions. To be more specific, we assume that
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in each state a different factor copula determines the dependence structure of the data,
whereas the marginal distributions are the same across states. That is, we do not only
allow the factor copula parameters γc to differ across states, but potentially also the dis-
tributions for the common factor and idiosyncratic shocks, Fz and Fε, and number of
common factors. The density of the data conditional on St = j is:
f (j)(Yt|Y1:(t−1), St = k) = c(j)(u1,t, . . . , ud,t; γ(j)c )
d∏
i=1
fi(yi,t; θm,i) (18)
Note how the state indexes the copula, but not the marginal distributions. The copula
is exclusively driven by St, in particular it does not depend on past observations or past
realizations of copula parameters. We assume St to be generated from a first order Markov
chain, that is, St depends only on St−1, with the following transition probability matrix:
P =
 p11 1− p11
1− p22 p22
 (19)
where pij = P(St = j|St−1 = i) denotes the probability of moving from state i to state j
the next period. Because the rows must clearly sum to one P is entirely parameterized by
p11 and p22. A distinct feature of Markov-switching copula models is that they do not only
allow copula parameters to change through time but also for changes in the structural
characteristics of dependence, through different copula densities in the different regimes.
Markov-switching copulas could, for instance, allow for changes from a symmetric to an
asymmetric dependence structure or from a dependence structure exhibiting no tail de-
pendence to one with tail dependence.
Alternative approaches for modeling time-varying dependence through copulas are
available. However, several researchers modeling time-varying dependence of financial as-
sets in the copula context through so called observation-driven approaches such as time-
varying correlations (Jondeau and Rockinger (2006)), ARMA-models (Patton (2006b)),
DCC copulas (Christoffersen et al. (2012)) or Generalized Autoregressive Score models
(Oh and Patton (2016)) document very high persistence of estimated dependence pa-
rameters. This finding is indicative of the presence of large but infrequent breaks in the
dependence structure, possibly induced by stochastic regime switches. It has first been
pointed out by Jondeau and Rockinger (2006) in the context of copula models, but dis-
cussed earlier for volatility models, see Diebold and Inoue (1999) for example, and further
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motivates the use of a Markov-switching model.
Markov-switching copula models have previously been studied by a number of au-
thors, mostly in two dimensions. Jondeau and Rockinger (2006) are among the first to
employ Markov-switching in the context of copulas, allowing the parameters of a bivariate
t copula to switch between two states. Rodriguez (2007) builds a Markov-switching mix-
ture copula based model in which margins and copula switch jointly, thereby requiring
joint estimation of marginal and copula parameters. He does, through regime-switches in
the mixture weight, allow for changes in the copula density. He employs his model to a
number of pairs of stock indices to investigate financial contagion in international equity
markets. To this end he analyzes changes in the dependence structure associated with
regime changes from the crisis (high volatility) to the non-crises (low volatility) regime.
Okimoto (2008) employs bivariate Markov-switching copula based models to study asym-
metric dependence in international equity markets. He follows Rodriguez (2007) in that
he allows for different copula densities in different regimes and joint switching of margins
and copula.
A few multivariate applications of Markov-switching copula models exist. Chollete
et al. (2009) employ Markov-switching copula models with one Gaussian and one canonical
vine regime to model two data sets consisting of international equity indices, one for the
countries of the G5 and one consisting of four Latin American countries. They compare
VaR and Expected Shortfall of different models and also replicate the portfolio selection
exercise of Ang and Chen (2002) to investigate the economic costs of ignoring regime-
switching. Garcia and Tsafack (2011) propose a Markov-switching mixture copula model
with one regime with a symmetric dependence structure and one asymmetric regime in
order to study asymmetries in the dependence structure as well as extreme co-movements
in international equity and bond markets. They study two equity and two bond indices
jointly. Stöber and Czado (2012) employ Markov-switching regular vine copulas to three
different data sets, one consisting of returns on ten German stocks. Härdle et al. (2015)
employ Markov-switching hierarchical Archimedean copulas to model two different data
sets, including one on three foreign exchange rates, for which they also compute VaR. In
multivariate Markov-switching copula based models the margins are typically not allowed
to be affected by the regime-switching in order to allow for multi-stage estimation, an
approach we follow.
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3 Estimation of Markov-switching factor copula models
We now turn to the estimation of Markov-switching factor copula models, which is based
on multi-stage maximum likelihood. We first present the total log-likelihood of a Markov-
switching factor copula based model. We then show algorithms for inference on the
latent state, which are required to obtain the log-likelihood. Next we present a decom-
position of the log-likelihood in order to facilitate multi-stage estimation, thus making
high-dimensional applications feasible. We then define the estimator and show how we
obtain standard errors. Finally we present a numerical integration method to obtain the
factor copula density.
3.1 Log-likelihood and inference on the hidden state
Let the observed data be denoted as: Y1:n = (Y
′
1 , ..., Y
′
n)
′. The log-likelihood function is:
L(Y1:n; θm, θc) =
n∑
t=1
log f(Yt; θm, θc|Y1:(t−1)) (20)
where θc = (γ
(1)′
c , γ
(2)′
c , p11, p22)
′ contains all parameters of the Markov-switching factor
copula, that is, the copula parameters for each regime and the transition probability
parameters. The density of Yt, and therefore the log-likelihood, depends on the hidden
state. Given that St is unobservable we need to integrate over all possible values:
f(Yt; θm, θc|Y1:(t−1)) =
2∑
i=1
P(St = i|Y1:(t−1); θm, θc) · f(Yt; θm, θc|Y1:(t−1), St = k) (21)
where P(St = i|Y1:(t−1); θm, θc) is the probability of being in a given state at time t given
all observations up to t − 1. This probability is referred to as a predicted probability.
We now state the approach of Hamilton (1989) to obtain predicted probabilities in order
to evaluate equation (21), adapting the notation in Hamilton (1994) to our factor copula
model with two regimes. Let
ηt =
f (1)(Yt; θm, θ(1)c |Y1:(t−1))
f (2)(Yt; θm, θ
(2)
c |Y1:(t−1))
 (22)
denote the (2x1) vector containing the density of the data conditional on the regimes
St. Next, let ξ̂t|t−1 denote the (2x1) vector that contains the predicted probability for
both of the states, that is ξ̂t|t−1 = (P(St = 1|Y1:(t−1); θm, θc),P(St = 2|Y1:(t−1); θm, θc))′.
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Similarly, let ξ̂t|t denote the (2x1) vector that contains the probabilities of being in a
given state at time t given all observations up to t for both of the states, that is ξ̂t|t =
(P(St = 1|Y1:t; θm, θc),P(St = 2|Y1:t; θm, θc))′. These probabilities are referred to as filtered
probabilities. Given a starting value ξ̂1|0, the following equations now form a filter to
obtain optimal ξ̂t|t and ξ̂t+1|t for each t:
ξ̂t|t =
ξ̂t|t−1  ηt
1′(ξ̂t|t−1  ηt)
(23)
ξ̂t+1|t = P ′ξ̂t|t (24)
where  denotes the Hadamard, or element by element, product and 1 denotes a column
vector of ones. For the starting value ξ̂1|0 we follow the suggestion of Hamilton (1994) and
choose ξ̂1|0 = ((1−p22)/(2−p11−p22), (1−p11)/(2−p11−p22))′, which corresponds to the
ergodic probabilities of the Markov chain. The unconditional density is then evaluated
as: f(Yt; θm, θc|Y1:(t−1)) = ξ̂′t|t−1ηt and the log-likelihood can thus be expressed as:
L(Y1:n; θm, θc) =
n∑
t=1
log(ξ̂′t|t−1ηt) (25)
In addition to filtered and predicted probabilities we want to base our regime
classification on smoothed probabilities, that is, the probability of being in a certain
regime at time t based on the full sample. These can be obtained through the algorithm
of Kim (1994):
ξ̂t|n = ξ̂t|t 
{
P ·
[
ξ̂t+1|n(÷)ξ̂t+1|t
]}
(26)
where ξ̂t|n = (P(St = 1|Y1:n; θm, θc),P(St = 2|Y1:n; θm, θc))′ is the (2x1) vector of smoothed
probabilities and (÷) denotes element-wise division. Once ξ̂n|n is obtained from equation
(23) for t = n, equation (26) can be iterated backward for t = n− 1 to t = 1.
One approach would be to estimate the parameters of the margins and the copula
simultaneously by maximizing equation (25). However, given the large number of pa-
rameters in our empirical application and strong nonlinearities of the objective function
implied by the regime-switching, this is infeasible. Instead we apply a two-stage estima-
tion procedure (Newey and McFadden (1994), Patton (2006a)), which can be employed
since the marginal distributions are not affected by the latent state variable. This es-
timation procedure has been applied in a similar context by Engle (2002) for the DCC
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model, Pelletier (2006) for a regime-switching DCC model and Chollete et al. (2009) as
well as Garcia and Tsafack (2011) for Markov-switching copula based models. In order
to facilitate two-stage estimation, the log-likelihood must be decomposed into two parts,
one for the marginal distributions and one for the copula. In what follows we present this
decomposition:
Proposition (Decomposition of the log-likelihood).
The log-likelihood function can be decomposed into two parts, one for the marginal dis-
tribution and one for the copula:
L(Y1:n; θm, θc) =
d∑
i=1
Lm,i(θm,i) + Lc(θc, θm) (27)
where
Lm,i(θm,i) =
n∑
t=1
log(fi(yi,t; θm,i|Y1:(t−1))
Lc(θc, θm) =
n∑
t=1
log(ξ̂′t|t−1ηct)
with
ηct =
c(1)(u1,t, ..., ud,t; γ(1)c )
c(2)(u1,t, ..., ud,t; γ
(1)
c )

and ξ̂t|t−1 is obtained from the following filter:
ξ̂t|t =
ξ̂t|t−1  ηct
1′(ξ̂t|t−1  ηct)
(28)
ξ̂t+1|t = P ′ξ̂t|t (29)
Proof: See Chollete et al. (2009) or Garcia and Tsafack (2011).
Therefore we can split the log-likelihood into two parts, Lc(θc, θm) for the copula
and
∑d
i=1 Lm,i(θm,i) for the margins, where the latter can be further split resulting in one
term for each of the margins. The copula likelihood depends on θm because the marginal
parameters are needed to obtain the probability integral transforms. Now we can first
estimate the parameters of each of the marginal distributions:
θ̂m,i = argmax
θm,i
Lm,i(θm,i) (30)
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Given θ̂m = (θ̂m,1, ..., θ̂m,n)
′ we then estimate the copula parameters in a second step:
θ̂c = argmax
θc
Lc(θc, θ̂m) (31)
This two-stage procedure is less efficient than one-stage estimation but makes estimation
of high-dimensional models feasible.
3.2 Obtaining standard errors
We employ results from Patton (2006a) for copula based time-series models, which are
based on the findings of Newey and McFadden (1994). Under standard regularity condi-
tions the two-stage maximum likelihood estimator θ̂ = (θ̂′m, θ̂
′
c)
′ is asymptotically normal:
√
T (θ̂ − θ0) L→ N(0, A−1T BT (A−1T )′) (32)
with
A =
 ∇θmθmLm(Y1:n; θm) 0
∇θmθcLm(Y1:n; θc, θc) ∇θcθcLc(Y1:n; θm, θc)

and
B = Var
[∑n
t=1
(
n−1/2∇′θmLm(Yt; θm), n−1/2∇′θcLc(Yt; θm, θc)
)]
While the two stage approach simplifies estimation, for the estimation of copula standard
errors we have to account for parameter estimation error arising from the estimation of
the marginal distribution parameters. In particular this rules out the possibility of simply
working with the inverse Hessian of the copula likelihood. Moreover, the information ma-
trix equality does not hold for two-stage maximum likelihood estimation and the above
sandwich form asymptotic variance-covariance matrix arises. The variance-covariance
matrix for the copula parameters clearly also depends on the parameters of the marginal
distributions. Evaluating A and B numerically can be cumbersome, instead we obtain
standard errors through the following simulation procedure: First, we simulate from the
model for the entire joint distribution, that is we first simulate from the Markov-switching
factor copula, we then apply the corresponding inverse Skew t distribution with the esti-
mated degree of freedom and skewness parameters and then rescale with the conditional
mean and standard deviation from the corresponding ARMA-GARCH model. Second,
using the data obtained in the previous step we first estimate the marginal models, obtain
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standardized residuals and then estimate the Markov-switching factor copula. These steps
are repeated 100 times in order to obtain simulation based standard errors. This approach
yields correct finite sample results and does not rely on asymptotic theory. See Patton
(2013) for details and alternative approaches to estimate standard errors in parametric
copula based models.
3.3 Obtaining the factor copula density
To facilitate maximum likelihood estimation for factor copulas, the factor copula den-
sity implied by equation (16), which is in general not available in closed form, must be
evaluated. We now present a multi-dimensional extension of the approach of Oh and
Patton (2016), who propose to obtain the copula density through a numerical integration
procedure. The copula density of X can be presented as:
c(u1, ..., ud) =
fX(G
−1
1 (u1), ..., G
−1
d (ud))
g1(G
−1
1 (u1)) · ... · gd(G−1d (ud))
(33)
where fX(x1, ..., xd) is the joint density of X, gi(xi) is the marginal density of xi ,G
−1
i (xi)
is the inverse marginal distribution of xi, and c(u1, ..., ud) the copula density. Next,
we state how to obtain fX(x1, ...., xd), gi(xi) and G
−1
i (xi). Due to the independence of
Z = (z1, ..., zk) and εi we have:
fxi|Z(xi|z1, ..., zk) = fεi(xi − βi,1z1 − ...− βi,kzk) (34)
Fxi|Z(xi|z1, ..., zk) = Fεi(xi − βi,1z1 − ...− βi,kzk) (35)
fX|Z(x1, ..., xd|z1, ..., zk) =
d∏
i=1
fεi(xi − βi,1z1 − ...− βi,kzk) (36)
Integration over the common factors gives:
gi(xi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
...
∫ ∞
−∞
fxi,Z(xi, z1, ..., zk) dz1...dzk (37)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
...
∫ ∞
−∞
fxi|Z(xi|z1, ..., zk)fz1(z1) · ... · fzk(zk) dz1...dzk (38)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
...
∫ ∞
−∞
fεi(xi − βi,1z1 − ...− βi,kzk)fz1(z1) · ... · fzk(zk) dz1...dzk (39)
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and similarly
Gi(xi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
...
∫ ∞
−∞
Fεi(xi − βi,1z1 − ...− βi,kzk)fz1(z1) · ... · fzk(zk) dz1...dzk
(40)
fx(x1, ..., xd) =
∫ ∞
−∞
...
∫ ∞
−∞
d∏
i=1
fεi(xi − βi,1z1 − ...− βi,kzk)fz1(z1) · ... · fzk(zk) dz1...dzk
(41)
Using change of variable ui = Fzi(zi) and that the common factors are independent, we
obtain bounded integrals:
gi(xi) =
∫ 1
0
...
∫ 1
0
fεi(xi − βi,1F−1z1 (u1)− ...− βi,kF−1zk (uk)) du1...duk (42)
Gi(xi) =
∫ 1
0
...
∫ ∞
−∞
Fεi(xi − βi,1F−1z1 (u1)− ...− βi,kF−1zk (uk)) du1...duk (43)
fx(x1, ..., xd) =
∫ 1
0
...
∫ ∞
−∞
d∏
i=1
fεi(xi − βi,1F−1z1 (u1)− ...− βi,kF−1zk (uk)) du1...duk (44)
Following Oh and Patton (2016) we evaluate these integrals using Gauss-Legendre numer-
ical integration with 50 abscissas. For the inversion of Gi(xi), which is a function of xi
and βi,1, ..., βi,k, we compute G over a wide range of points and then use piecewise cubic
hermite-interpolation to obtain G−1i (xi).
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4 Copula based Multi-CoVaR and Shapley value
In this chapter we first present an introduction to the bivariate CoVaR systemic risk
measure. We then show a multivariate extension and how this Multi-CoVaR measure can
be characterized through Markov-switching factor copulas. Finally, we present how total
systemic risk and individual systemic risk contributions can be obtained in the Multi-
CoVaR framework.
4.1 CoVaR
We begin with recalling the definition of VaR of a random variable yi,t:
P(yi,t ≤ V aRiα,t) = α (45)
That is, the VaR is the α-quantile of the conditional distribution of yi,t. VaR is one of
the most popular risk measures used by regulators and in the financial industry. In the
system risk context yi,t commonly refers to the return on a financial institution. However,
VaR as a risk measure of one institution in isolation does not necessarily reflect systemic
risk. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) introduce CoVaR, where the prefix stands for
'conditional, contagion, comovement' as the VaR of the financial system conditional on
some event of an individual financial institution. More specifically, CoVaR of Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2008), the VaR of the financial system (with return yd,t) conditional on
some event D(yi,t) defined in terms of the return of institution i, is implicitly defined by:
P(yd,t ≤ CoV aRD(yi,t)α,t |D(yi,t)) = α (46)
That is, CoV aR
D(yi,t)
α,t is the α-quantile of the conditional distribution of yd,t|D(yi,t).
Typically D(yi,t) refers to distress of institution i and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008)
use yi,t = V aR
i
α,t, that is, an institution's return being equal to its VaR, as the event
for distress in order to obtain their systemic risk measure. Additionally, they define
yi,t = V aR
i
0.5,t, that is, an institution's return being equal to its median, as the event for
the median state of an institution. Their measure of an institution's marginal contribu-
tion to systemic risk, its ∆CoVaR is the difference between CoVaR conditional on the
institution being in distress and CoVaR conditional on the median state of the institution.
Thus institution i's systemic risk contribution to the financial system is:
∆CoV ariα,t = CoV aR
yi,t=V aR
i
α,t
α,t − CoV aR
yi,t=V aR
i
0.5,t
α,t (47)
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The intuition behind CoVaR and ∆CoVaR is the following: The systemic risk measure
CoVaR is high when distress of institution i coincides with distress of the financial system
and the systemic risk contribution ∆CoVaR estimates by how much distress of institution
i increases systemic distress, thus capturing spillover effects of institution i to the finan-
cial system. As Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) point out, CoVaR is more extreme than
unconditional VaR because it conditions on an adverse event with typically lower mean,
higher variance, higher negative skewness and higher kurtosis. Since CoVaR focuses on
the tail distribution, it reflects changes in these moments.
Mainik and Schaaning (2012) as well as Girardi and Ergün (2013) suggest chang-
ing the conditioning event for distress to yi,t ≤ V aRiα,t, which allows for a more severe
distress definition. Mainik and Schaaning (2012) show that changing the conditioning
event in this way has important implications for the consistency of the CoVaR measure
with respect to the level of dependence. They show, for a range of distributions, that Co-
VaR with the modified conditioning event is continuous and that systemic risk increases
with the dependence parameter, whereas this does not hold for the CoVaR definition
of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008). Furthermore does the modified definition of Co-
VaR with yi,t ≤ V aRiα,t as distress event allow for back testing using standard Kupiec-
and Christoffersen tests, as shown by Girardi and Ergün (2013). We follow Mainik and
Schaaning (2012) and Girardi and Ergün (2013) and choose yi,t ≤ V aRiα,t as event for
distress of an institution. Different approaches to estimate bivariate CoVaR have been
proposed. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) employ quantile regression, Girardi and Ergün
(2013) use bivariate DCC-GARCH models, whereas Reboredo and Ugolini (2015a) employ
copulas.
4.2 Multi-CoVaR
Financial crisis are often characterized by multiple institutions being in distress at the
same time. Therefore, when measuring the systemic risk contribution of an institution
this institution should not be considered in isolation because distress might also propa-
gate through other institutions being distressed at the same time. This is why Cao (2013)
proposes Multi-CoVar, an extension of the bivariate CoVaR measure with a conditioning
event including multiple institutions, thus capturing distress spillovers among these insti-
4.2 Multi-CoVaR 23
tutions.
In what follows we explain the Multi-CoVaR measure in more detail. Consider a
set of d − 1 institutions U = {1, .., d− 1}, the random variables y1,t, ..., yd−1,t, referring
to their respective returns, with marginal distributions F1, ..., Fd−1. We are interested
in the CoVaR with respect to the financial system, which has return yd,t with marginal
distribution Fd. Now let S be a set of s ≤ d − 1 institutions indexed as {s1, ..., ss} with
S ⊆ U . The conditioning event for the Multi-CoVaR measure is based on the returns of
the institutions in S and denoted as D(ys1,t, ..., yss,t). Multi-CoVaR is implicitly defined
as:
P(yd,t ≤ CoV aRD(ys1,t,...,yss,t)α,t |D(ys1,t, ..., yss,t)) = α (48)
That is, CoV aR
D(ys1,t,...,yss,t)
α,t is the VaR of the financial system conditional on some event
of multiple individual financial institutions or equivalently the α-quantile of the condi-
tional distribution of yd,t|D(ys1,t, ..., yss,t). This definition is very flexible as it allows
constructing various events on different sets of institutions. We construct conditioning
events as follows: We consider an institution being in distress when yi,t ≤ V aRiα,t, that is,
when its return is at or below the individual VaR level, and we consider an institution be-
ing in its median state when V aRi0.25,t ≤ yi,t ≤ V aRi0.75,t, that is, when its return is within
the corresponding interquartile range. For each of the 2d−1 distinct sets of institutions S
we consider two different events: The first corresponds to all institutions in S being in
distress, and in order to simplify the notation we write ACoVaR for the Multi-CoVaR of
this event. Thus ACoVaR is implicitly defined as:
P(yd,t ≤ ACoV aRSα,t|ys1,t ≤ V aRs1α,t, ..., yss,t ≤ V aRssα,t)) = α (49)
The second event we consider is when all institutions in S are in their median state and
in order to simplify the notation, we write NCoVaR for the Multi-CoVaR of this event.
Thus NCoVaR is implicitly defined as:
P(yd,t ≤ NCoV aRSα,t|V aRs10.25,t ≤ ys1,t ≤ V aRs10.75,t, ..., V aRss0.25,t ≤ yss,t ≤ V aRss0.75,t)) = α
(50)
Using Bayes' theorem, equation (49) can be expressed as:
P(yd,t ≤ ACoV aRSα,t, ys1,t ≤ V aRs1α,t, ..., yss,t ≤ V aRssα,t)
P(ys1,t ≤ V aRs1α,t, ..., yss,t ≤ V aRssα,t)
= α (51)
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Similarly for NCoV aRSα we obtain:
P(yd,t ≤ NCoV aRSα,t, V aRs10.25,t ≤ ys1,t ≤ V aRs10.75,t, ..., V aRss0.25,t ≤ yss,t ≤ V aRss0.75,t)
P(V aRs10.25,t ≤ ys1,t ≤ V aRs10.75,t, ..., V aRss0.25,t ≤ yss,t ≤ V aRss0.75,t)
= α
(52)
Cao (2013) expresses equation (51) as follows:∫ ACoV aRSα,t
−∞
∫ V aRs1α,t
−∞ ...
∫ V aRssα,t
−∞ fs+1(yd,t, ys1,t, ..., yss,t) dyd,tdys1,t...dyss,t∫ V aRs1α,t
−∞ ...
∫ V aRssα,t
−∞ fs(ys1,t, ..., yss,t) dys1,t...dyss,t
= α (53)
where fs and fs+1 are the conditional joint densities of (ys1,t, ..., yss,t) and (yd,t, ys1,t, ..., yss,t),
respectively. Equivalently for equation (52)4:∫ NCoV aRSα,t
−∞
∫ V aRs10.75,t
V aR
s1
0.25,t
...
∫ V aRss0.75,t
V aRss0.25,t
fs+1(yd,t, ys1,t, ..., yss,t) dyd,tdys1,t...dyss,t∫ V aRs1α,t
−∞ ...
∫ V aRss0.75,t
V aRss0.25,t
fs(ys1,t, ..., yss,t) dys1,t...dyss,t
= α (54)
Cao (2013) then obtains ACoV aRSα,t and NCoV aR
S
α,t as solutions to equation (53) and
equation (54), respectively, which requires numerical evaluation of multi-dimensional inte-
grals. He models the conditional joint density as a multivariate t distribution with condi-
tional variances obtained through univariate GARCH models and conditional correlations
through bivariate DCC models. In order to compute V aRiα,t he employs a nonparametric
bootstrap, thereby relaxing the distributional assumption resulting from the multivariate
t distribution.
4.3 Copula based estimation of Multi-CoVaR
As opposed to Cao (2013) and Bernardi et al. (2014), who employ multivariate time series
models, we employ copula based models for the estimation of Multi-CoVaR. Expressing
equation (51) in terms of copulas we obtain:
Cs+1(zA,t, α, ..., α)
Cs(α, ..., α)
= α (55)
where Cs+1 is the copula of (ud,t, us1,t, ..., uss,t), Cs is the copula of (us1,t, ..., uss,t) and
zA,t = Fd(ACoV aR
S
α,t). Similarly, for equation (52) we get:
Cs+1(zN,t, 0.75, ..., 0.75)− Cs+1(zN,t, 0.25, ..., 0.25)
Cs(0.75, ..., 0.75)− Cs(0.25, ..., 0.25) = α (56)
4Note that the conditioning event for the median state in Cao (2013) is expressed as a one standard
deviation around the median event, whereas we use the interquartile range.
4.4 Total systemic risk and individual systemic risk contributions 25
where zN,t = Fd(NCoV aR
S
α,t). Thus ACoV aR
S
α,t can be obtained by first solving equation
(55) numerically for zA,t and settingACoV aR
S
α,t = F
−1
d (zA,t) in a second step. NCoV aR
S
α,t
is obtained in the same way from equation (56).
For the computation of Multi-CoVaR, copulas offer great computational advan-
tages compared to multivariate time series models. This becomes clear when comparing
equation (53) and (54) to equation (56) respectively (55), where only nominal VaR levels
and not V aRiα,t itself is required. Furthermore, no multi-dimensional integrals need to be
solved as long as the copula cdf is available in closed form. The computational advantages
of copulas over time-series models have already been pointed out by Reboredo and Ugolini
(2015a) in the context of bivariate CoVaR estimation.
Solving equation (55) and equation (56) for zA,t and zN,t, respectively, requires eval-
uating the copula cdf, which is not available in closed form for most factor copulas. We
approximate the factor copula cdf through simulation: First obtain a large sample from
equation (16) for which we compute the empirical probability integral transform. That
is, we apply the respective empirical marginal cdf to each series to obtain data that has
Uniform(0, 1) marginal distributions but the dependence structure implied by the factor
copula model. The resulting sample is then used to approximate the factor copula cdf
C. We found this approach superior to Monte-Carlo integration over the factor copula
pdf. Given a two-state Markov-switching process for the factor copula, we obtain C as
a mixture of factor copulas as C = ωtC
(1) + (1 − ωt)C(2), where C(1) and C(2) are factor
copula cdfs for the two regimes and for the mixture weight ωt we employ the smoothed
probability for the first regime, that is, ωt = P(St = 1|Y1:n; θm, θc). Therefore we have to
simulate two samples to approximate C, one for each state. These samples can be used
for each evaluation of the solver and each period t.
4.4 Total systemic risk and individual systemic risk contributions
Multi-∆CoVaR, the systemic risk contribution, of a set S of institutions is defined as:
∆CoV aRSα,t = ACoV aR
S
α,t −NCoV aRSα,t (57)
That is, the systemic risk contribution of S is measured as the difference of the finan-
cial system VaR conditional on distress and median state of the institutions in S. The
total systemic risk based on the Multi-CoVaR measure is naturally obtained when all
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institutions in the system are in distress jointly, that is, the total systemic risk equals
∆CoV aRUα,t.
In a next step we want to obtain a measure for the individual systemic risk contribu-
tion of an institution. Because we want to account for distress spillovers among individual
financial institutions, we do not want to simply measure the systemic risk contribution of
institution i as ∆CoV aR
{i}
α,t , that is, the ∆CoVaR when only institution i is in distress,
which corresponds to the definition of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008). Instead we em-
ploy Shapley value methodology (Shapley (1953)), a general attribution procedure from
cooperative game theory, which allows to efficiently allocate the total systemic risk among
the individual institutions. It has previously been employed for portfolio (Koylouglu and
Stoker (2002)) and systemic risk allocation (Tarashev et al. (2010), Cao (2013), Bernardi
et al. (2014)). Shapley value has originally been proposed to share total wealth or cost
among a set of players U of a cooperative game. The Shapley value of a player is the
share of total wealth or cost that can efficiently be attributed to this player. In order
to employ Shapley value methodology a (super)additive characteristic function v, which
must be the same across all possible groups of players, is employed. The characteristic
function applied to the set of all players, v(U), must equal the total wealth or cost and
v(∅) must be zero.
In the context of systemic risk allocation (which can clearly be understood as allo-
cating a cost) the players are financial institutions and v corresponds to a systemic risk
measure that is defined on sets of financial institutions. The individual systemic risk con-
tribution of an institution is its Shapley value. Shapley value of institution i is computed
as:
SVi(v) =
∑
S⊆U\{i}
|S|!((d− 1)− |S| − 1)!
(d− 1)! (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) (58)
where the sum is computed over all subsets S ⊆ U not containing institution i and d− 1
is the number of players in U . The general idea behind Shapley value is the following:
Suppose players are ordered randomly and assume S is the set of players appearing before
player i. The term v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) then corresponds to the contribution of player i to
the cost or wealth of group S. There are (d−1)! possible orderings and the Shapley value
of a player is the average contribution over all orderings when all orderings receive equal
weight.
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Shapley (1953) shows that SVi uniquely fulfills the following axioms, which carry intuitive
meaning for systemic risk allocation:
1. Efficiency/Additivity:
∑
i∈U SVi(v) = v(U). The sum of the individual systemic
risk contributions equals the total systemic risk.
2. Dummy axiom: If v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) = v({i}) ∀S ⊆ U with i /∈ S then SVi(v) =
v({i}). The systemic risk contribution of institution i equals its ∆CoVaR if institu-
tion i is orthogonal to all other institutions. When the orthogonality is not fulfilled,
the systemic risk contribution obtained through the Shapley value methodology
does not equal ∆CoV aR
{i}
α,t , potentially leading to differing systemic risk rankings
of institutions and total systemic risk, as pointed out by Cao (2013).
3. Symmetry/Fairness: If v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) ∀S ⊆ U such that j 6= i and
i, j /∈ S, then SVi(v) = SVj(v). This axiom states that the individual systemic
risk contribution for two institutions is the same when their marginal systemic risk
contributions over any subset S are the same.
4. Linearity: Let v = ω1v1 + ω2v2 be a linear combination of two characteristic func-
tions, then SVi(v) = ω1SVi(v1) + ω2SVi(v2) ∀i ∈ U . This axiom states that the
individual systemic risk contributions based on a linear combination of systemic
risk measures can be obtained as a linear combination of the initial systemic risk
contributions. For systemic risk allocation different systemic risk measures can be
employed in a single attribution procedure.
5. Zero player: If v(S∪{i})−v(S) = 0 ∀S ⊆ U with i /∈ S, then SVi(v) = 0. A financial
institution that carries no systemic risk has zero systemic risk contribution.
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5 Results
In this chapter we turn to a description of our results. We begin with a description
of our data set and show results from marginal models. We then move on to studying
the dependence structure and presenting estimation results for several Markov-switching
factor copula models. Finally, we present results for government debt systemic risk for
the Euro Area financial sector.
5.1 Data description and univariate results
We analyze systemic risk for the Euro Area financial sector of eight sovereign debt mar-
kets, three core countries (Germany (DE), France (FR) and the Netherlands (NL)) and
five PIIGS countries (Portugal (PT), Italy (IT), Ireland (IR), Greece (GR) and Spain
(ES)), over the period 04 May 2005 to 27 April 2016 using weekly log-returns on ten year
benchmark government bond indices obtained from Datastream. The performance of the
Euro Area financial sector is measured using weekly log-returns on the Datastream EMU
Financials index (EMU FINA), over the same period.
Figure 2 displays the corresponding price series. The financial sector index shows
Figure 2: This figure presents price indices of the Euro Area financial sector
(EMU FINA) and ten year government bonds over the periods 04 May 2005
to 27 April 2016 (n = 574). 04 May 2005 = 100.
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heightened volatility from the beginning of 2008 with a strong reduction in value, reflecting
the fallout of the global financial crisis in Europe. From September 2008 the government
bonds decouple. The indices of the PIIGS countries show heightened volatility, with a
distinct reduction in value that is later reversed for all but the Greek bond. The bond
indices of the three core countries remain stable and display low volatility throughout the
sample period. In table 1 we present summary statistics for the return series. Most series
EMU FINA DE FR ES PT IT IR NL GR
mean -0.0002 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0011
std 0.0421 0.0085 0.0082 0.0122 0.0223 0.0119 0.0161 0.0080 0.0514
skew -0.32 -0.19 -0.52 1.15 -0.02 0.22 -0.09 -0.38 -0.05
kurt 4.70 3.73 4.92 10.75 11.77 12.58 15.98 3.93 22.95
JB [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Table 1: This table presents summary statistics for weekly log-returns of a
Euro Area financial sector index (EMU FINA) and ten year government bonds
indices. JB denotes p-values of Jarque-Bera tests.
have a mean return slightly above zero, only the financial sector index and government
bond index of GR display negative mean returns. These two series also have the highest
volatility, as measured by the standard deviation. All series but the government bond
indices for ES and IT show negative skewness. Kurtosis is well above three for all series,
with higher kurtosis for the government bond indices of the PIIGS countries than for the
indices of the three core countries. Jarque-Bera tests strongly reject normality for all
series.
In order to take time variation in conditional means and variances into account
we model each series using univariate ARMA(l,m)-GJR-GARCH(p,o,q) models (Glosten
et al. (1993)):
yi,t = µi +
l∑
j=1
φi,jyi,t−j +
m∑
k=1
ψi,kui,t−k + ui,t (59)
ui,t =
√
σ2i,tzi,t (60)
σ2i,t = ωi +
p∑
j=1
αi,ju
2
i,t−j +
o∑
k=1
γi,ku
2
i,t−kI {ui,t−k < 0}+
q∑
l=1
δi,lσ
2
i,t−q (61)
zi,t ∼ Skew t(νi, λi) (62)
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where I {ui,t−k < 0} = 1 if ui,t−k < 0 and I {ui,t−k < 0} = 0 otherwise. The term∑o
k=1 γi,ku
2
i,t−kI {ui,t−k < 0} allows for an asymmetric impact of ui,t−k on volatility, where
typically the impact of negative returns on volatility is stronger than the impact of posi-
tive returns and therefore γi,k > 0, which is commonly referred to as leverage effect. The
standardized residuals zi,t are assumed to follow the Skew t distribution of Hansen (1994),
with density as in equation (14). This distribution can account for the fattailedness and
skewness often found in financial time series. Modeling skewness in marginal distribu-
tions is important to distinguish skewness from asymmetric dependence, which we want
to investigate later. In order to account for the relatively high autocorrelation found in
the government bond series we consider a lag order up to three for the ARMA models.
For the conditional variance we consider the following specifications: constant, ARCH(1),
GARCH(1,1) GJR-GARCH(1,1,1), ARCH(2), GARCH(2,2), GJR-GARCH(2,1,2), GJR-
GARCH(2,2,2), GARCH(3,3) and GARCH(4,4). The best model for each series is selected
using the AIC. We perform ARCH-LM as well as Ljung-Box tests to test for residual au-
tocorrelation and Kolomogorov-Smirnoff as well as Cramer-von Mieses tests to check that
the standardized residuals are well specified by Skew t models5. We obtain p-values for
Kolomogorov-Smirnoff and Cramer-von Mieses tests using simulation, thereby accounting
for parameter estimation error, see Patton (2013) for details. All estimation and test
results for the marginal models can be found in table 2. The estimated GJR-GARCH
models indicate strong persistence in conditional variances and existence of a leverage
effect for some series.
5See Fermanian and Scaillet (2005) for the consequences of misspecified marginal distribution models
in the context of copulas.
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EMU FINA DE FR ES PT IT IR NL GR
µi -0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0009 0.0003 0.0005 0.00 0.0006 -0.0011
(-0.11) (1.75) (1.84) (0.99) (0.43) (1.07) (0.57) (1.79) (-0.51)
φi,1 -0.3135 -0.9315 0.8911 -0.1524 0.0489
(-2.73) (-20.76) (4.32) (-3.66) (1.18)
φi,2 0.1015 -1.0778 0.1152 -0.1571
(0.74) (-9.17) (2.77) (-3.85)
φi,3 0.8821 0.3613 0.1689
(7.88) (1.86) (4.09)
ψi,1 0.3146 0.8876 -0.8825 0.09
(2.42) (14.92) (-4.41) (4.67)
ψi,2 -0.0769 1.0468
(-0.51) (10.28)
ψi,3 -0.8228 -0.4557
(-6.73) (-2.60)
ωi 3.4E-05 2.6E-06 7.6E-06 2.6E-06 4.2E-07 1.4E-06 8.3E-06 3.7E-06 2.4E-06
(2.08) (1.89) (2.40) (1.38) (0.80) (1.73) (2.86) (1.63) (1.96)
αi,1 9.8E-08 0.0814 0.1286 0.0504 0.0083 0.0802 0.0425 0.0805 0.0512
(0.71) (3.28) (2.88) (1.83) (0.29) (3.17) (1.15) (2.49) (1.58)
γi,1 0.2042 0.1303 0.0812 0.3178 0.1197
(2.74) (1.80) (3.37) (2.93) (2.79)
δi,1 0.8779 0.8825 0.7547 0.8708 0.9509 0.9088 0.7750 0.8621 0.8888
(20.35) (24.95) (9.89) (17.31) (43.05) (36.42) (16.87) (14.59) (27.64)
νi 76.8818 24.5513 14.6371 8.1577 7.8090 7.3696 3.8850 19.0068 4.5863
(0.98) (1.17) (1.82) (3.40) (3.67) (3.77) (5.98) (1.50) (6.17)
λi -0.1406 -0.0323 -0.0730 0.0401 -0.1116 -0.1242 -0.1067 -0.1050 -0.0766
(-2.50) (-0.50) (-1.19) (0.67) (-1.75) (-2.06) (-2.18) (-1.56) (-1.57)
LB [0.70] [0.53] [0.68] [0.22] [0.95] [0.70] [0.91] [0.28] [0.99]
ARCH [0.84] [0.71] [0.09] [0.92] [0.56] [0.13] [0.65] [0.64] [0.67]
LB2 [0.86] [0.69] [0.08] [0.92] [0.52] [0.17] [0.61] [0.63] [0.63]
CvM [0.45] [0.33] [0.69] [0.59] [0.28] [0.08] [1.00] [0.18] [0.80]
KS [0.65] [0.53] [0.88] [0.82] [0.17] [0.18] [1.00] [0.33] [0.84]
Table 2: This table presents parameter estimates and t-statistics (in paren-
theses) for the ARMA-GJR-GARCH-Skew t marginal distribution models for
log-returns of a Euro Area financial sector index (EMU FINA) and ten year
government bond indices. LB denotes the Ljung-Box test for autocorrelation
in ARMA residuals. ARCH denotes Engle's LM test for ARCH effects in stan-
dardized residuals and LB2 denotes the Ljung-Box test for autocorrelation in
squared standardized residuals. CvM and KS denote Cramer-von Mieses and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov specification tests for Skew t distribution, respectively.
We present p-values of all tests in square brackets.
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5.2 Multivariate results
We now want to analyze the dependence structure of our data set. An inspection of the
price series in figure 2 already reveals a first impression of the dependence structure. All
government bond series closely comove until September 2008, when they decouple and
dependence of the financial sector index and the PIIGS bonds increases. We now present
some dependence measures of our data. In table 3 we display the unconditional rank
correlation matrix and quantile dependence matrices for q = 0.1 and q = 0.9. Rank
correlations of the financial sector index and the core countries are negative, for the
financial sector and the PIIGS countries we observe low positive rank correlations.
EMU FINA DE FR ES PT IT IR NL GR
Rank correlations
EMU FINA
DE -0.41
FR -0.25 0.87
ES 0.11 0.46 0.60
PT 0.10 0.34 0.45 0.63
IT 0.12 0.47 0.63 0.84 0.66
IR 0.05 0.42 0.55 0.69 0.68 0.70
NL -0.34 0.95 0.91 0.53 0.41 0.55 0.50
GR 0.23 0.18 0.32 0.52 0.58 0.53 0.54 0.26
Quantile dependence
EMU FINA 0.31 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.26 0.17
DE 0.21 0.68 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.73 0.17
FR 0.12 0.71 0.44 0.31 0.40 0.45 0.77 0.26
ES 0.19 0.44 0.49 0.47 0.68 0.59 0.38 0.30
PT 0.21 0.33 0.37 0.44 0.38 0.47 0.28 0.35
IT 0.19 0.42 0.49 0.56 0.49 0.51 0.35 0.37
IR 0.14 0.49 0.44 0.51 0.56 0.45 0.40 0.33
NL 0.16 0.78 0.82 0.49 0.37 0.45 0.49 0.23
GR 0.24 0.21 0.26 0.38 0.40 0.35 0.37 0.24
Table 3: This table presents rank correlations and quantile dependence for
q = 0.1 (lower triangular part) and q = 0.9 (upper triangular part) of the data.
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All rank correlations of government bonds are positive, with highest values for DE, FR
and NL. The quantile dependence measures are higher between bond indices than between
the financial sector index and the bond indices.6 The difference of τ0.1 and τ0.9 reveals
some mild asymmetry.
We now turn to modeling the dependence of the government bond return series
and the returns on the EMU financial sector index with Markov-switching factor copulas.
We employ the multifactor-model as in equation (16), which we estimate as described
as in chapter 3. Given that we employ maximum likelihood estimation, different models
can always be compared on the basis of model selection criteria such as the AIC and
BIC or likelihood-ratio tests. However, having some prior information on the number of
factors necessary to describe the data can be useful and even necessary in high-dimensional
applications. To this end, Oh and Patton (2015) suggest a graphical tool, namely scree
plots. Scree plots display the ordered eigenvalues of a correlation matrix, in the context of
factor copulas the rank correlation matrix of the data. The number of factors is estimated
as the number of eigenvalues larger one, see Oh and Patton (2015) for details about this
estimator. We display a scree plot of the sample rank correlation matrix in figure 3.
Figure 3: This figure presents a plot of the ordered eigenvalues of the sample
rank correlation matrix.
6For the three negatively dependent pairs (EMU FINA, DE), (EMU FINA, FR) and (EMU FINA, NL)
we compute quantile dependence measures along the counter diagonal, see section 2.2 for details.
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The scree plot shows that there are two relatively large eigenvalues, both distinctly larger
than one, while the remaining eigenvalues are considerably smaller and gradually tail off,
with the third largest eigenvalue already being distinctly below one. Thus the scree plot
indicates two common factors.
We now present estimation results for several factor copula models. We employ
the Normal factor copula density as well as the Skew t − t factor copula density, which
is able to account for potential non-normal features of the data, such as tail dependence
and asymmetric dependence, through fat tailed and asymmetric common factors. The
simplest specification we estimate is a static model with just one common factor. We also
estimate models with two common factors, as indicated by the scree plot above. In order
to account for time-variation in the dependence structure we also estimate a number of
Markov-switching factor copula models, where we limit our analysis to models with two
regimes. We consider Markov-switching models with one common factor in both regimes,
one factor in one regime and two factors in the second regime, and two factors in both
regimes. A summary of the estimation results can be found in table 4, which contains
the number of parameters for each model, the copula log-likelihood as well as the model
selection criteria AIC and BIC.
For all specifications the Skew t−tmodels show distinctly lower values for the model
selection criteria than the corresponding Normal models, providing evidence against the
Normal Skew t-t
k(1) k(2) # param. Lc AIC BIC # param. Lc AIC BIC
1 9 1532.4 -3046.8 -3007.6 11 1910.7 -3799.4 -3751.5
2 18 2306.7 -4577.4 -4499.1 20 2591.0 -5142.0 -5054.9
1 1 20 2798.7 -5557.4 -5470.3 24 2851.8 -5655.6 -5551.1
1 2 29 3320.9 -6583.8 -6457.6 33 3400.3 -6734.6 -6591.0
2 2 38 3349.2 -6622.4 -6457.0 42 3451.5 -6819.0 -6636.2
Table 4: This table presents the number of parameters, log-likelihood (Lc),
model selection criteria (AIC and BIC) of Markov-switching and static factor
copula models with different numbers of common factors (k(1) is the number
of common factors in the first regime and k(2) the number of commons factor
in the second regime).
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Normal factor copula and showing that accounting for non-normal features of the de-
pendence structure of the data is important. We can see that including a second factor
in the static model distinctly lowers AIC and BIC values. When moving from static to
Markov-switching models we also see a distinct improvement in selection criteria, which
shows that allowing for dependence dynamics is important for this data set. Including a
second factor in only one regime increases the log-likelihood far more than moving from
this model to a model with two factors in both regimes. This could be interpreted as some
evidence for time-variation in the number of common factors. In fact, when considering
the Normal models, the lowest value for the BIC is achieved by the model with one factor
in the first regime and two factors in the second regime. However, AIC is lowest for the
model with two factors in both regimes. When considering the Skew t − t models the
best model according to both criteria is the Skew t − t factor copula with two common
factors, which thus is the best model overall according to these criteria.
We now turn to a detailed discussion of the estimation results for the model
which performed best according to model selection criteria, namely the Markov-switching
Skew t − t factor copula with two common factors in both regimes. We first display
smoothed and filtered probabilities of being in the first regime in figure 4. These prob-
Figure 4: This figure presents smoothed (solid) and filtered (dashed) prob-
abilities of the first regime based on a Markov-switching Skew t − t factor
copula with two common factors and two regimes.
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abilities are obtained through the algorithms of Hamilton and Kim, described in section
3.1. We base the following discussion on the smoothed probability, that is, the proba-
bility of being in a given regime based on the full sample up to t = n. We observe a
clear pattern: With only one very short exception in the beginning of 2008, the smoothed
probability for the first regime is very close to one until 17 September 2008, the week of
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The smoothed probability of being in the first regime
then remains very close to zero until the end of the sample period.
Table 5 displays the estimated copula parameters and t-statistics. We use the sim-
Regime one Regime two
param. t-stat. param. t-stat.
ν−1 0.15 (6.04) 0.17 (6.17)
λ -0.20 (-2.64) -0.04 (-0.72)
Factor 1
βEMU FINA,1 -0.14 (-2.15) -0.06 (-0.97)
βDE,1 9.40 (6.01) 2.79 (7.37)
βFR,1 19.69 (7.35) 2.59 (10.74)
βES,1 3.56 (11.14) 1.34 (7.63)
βPT,1 2.39 (8.36) 0.71 (6.55)
βIT,1 3.14 (11.05) 1.53 (8.27)
βIR,1 17.48 (11.26) 0.88 (6.76)
βNL,1 16.25 (7.32) 4.22 (7.52)
βGR,1 1.75 (10.65) 0.33 (3.79)
Factor 2
βEMU FINA,2 -0.48 (-7.32) 0.73 (7.78)
βDE,2 8.87 (6.34) -2.13 (-4.95)
βFR,2 18.62 (7.21) -1.04 (-3.33)
βES,2 3.90 (9.75) 0.77 (4.73)
βPT,2 2.64 (8.65) 0.53 (5.12)
βIT,2 2.64 (10.47) 0.83 (4.24)
βIR,2 22.17 (10.18) 0.54 (4.28)
βNL,2 15.86 (8.02) -2.32 (-4.90)
βGR,2 1.95 (12.06) 0.48 (4.99)
p11 0.9895 (729.24)
p22 0.9947 (636.84)
Table 5: This table presents parameters estimates and t-statistics (in paren-
theses) for a Markov-switching Skew t − t factor copula with two common
factors applied to weekly returns on a Euro Area financial sector index (EMU
FINA) and government bonds.
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ulation based approach described in section 3.2 with 100 simulations to obtain standard
errors. The transition matrix probabilities p11 and p22 are close to one, indicating high
persistence of the corresponding regimes, which confirms the impression from figure 4.
The estimated inverse degree of freedom parameters are similar in both regimes, implying
around seven degrees of freedom. Both are significant, implying non-normality in the form
of tail dependence. The estimated skewness parameter for the first regime is significantly
negative, indicating asymmetries in the dependence structure of the data. For the second
regime this parameter estimate is insignificant.
To complement table 5, we also display the estimated factor loadings graphically
in figure 5. The estimated loadings for the first regime are similar for both factors. All
Figure 5: This figure presents estimated factor loadings of a Markov-switching
Skew t − t factor copula with two common factors for the first regime (top)
and the second regime (bottom). Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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estimated loadings are positive and relatively large but for the financial sector index, for
which both factor loadings are negative. We find all estimated factor loadings for the first
regime to be significant at the usual significance levels. We study the model implied de-
pendence structure in more detail below, but the estimated factor loadings already point
to a dependence structure with high positive dependence for the government bond indices
and negative dependence for the government bond indices and the financial sector index.
The estimated loadings for the second regime, which is prevalent from 17 September
2008 onward, indicate greater heterogeneity. For one factor the estimated loading of the
financial sector index is not significantly different from zero, whereas all estimated load-
ings for the government bond indices for this factor are significant and positive. Therefore
this factor introduces positive dependence for the government bond indices, whereas it
implies zero dependence of government bond indices and the financial sector. The other
has negative loadings for the three core countries and positive loadings for all other bond
indices and the financial sector index. Thus, it introduces positive dependence for the
financial sector and the PIIGS government bond indices, but negative dependence for
the financial sector index with the three core countries. The second regime thus implies
positive dependence for the financial sector index and the PIIGS government bond in-
dices. Therefore, we see a distinct change in the dependence structure from the first to
the second regime, or equivalently with the Lehman Brothers default at the height of the
global financial crisis. Most notably the financial sector index and the PIIGS government
bonds become positively dependent.
We now want to study the dependence structure implied by the Markov-switching
Skew t− t factor copula model in more detail and analyze how well the model can repli-
cate the dependence structure of the data. We perform this analysis conditional on the
regime and focus on quantile dependence and rank correlations. In order to obtain condi-
tional dependence measures of the data we classify observations according to the smoothed
probability. More specifically, an observation is classified to belong to a given regime if
the corresponding smoothed probability is higher than 0.5. This conditional approach is
valid given the very strong regime classification with smoothed probabilities being close
to zero or one almost all the time. Neither quantile dependence nor rank correlations are
available in closed form for most factor copulas, including the Skew t− t factor copula.
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We obtain these quantities through simulation using a sample of size n = 500000 for each
regime.
We display the rank correlation matrices implied by the model and the data in table
6 for both regimes. For the first regime the model implies very high rank correlations close
EMU FINA DE FR ES PT IT IR NL GR
Regime one
EMU FINA -0.26 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.21 -0.27 -0.24 -0.24
DE -0.38 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.93
FR -0.38 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.93
ES -0.39 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.90
PT -0.38 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.91
IT -0.36 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.96 0.91
IR -0.41 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.99 0.94
NL -0.39 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.93
GR -0.37 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.92
Regime two
EMU FINA -0.46 -0.26 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.18 -0.38 0.40
DE -0.37 0.82 0.27 0.11 0.27 0.21 0.94 -0.09
FR -0.25 0.85 0.47 0.26 0.50 0.39 0.88 0.11
ES 0.20 0.28 0.44 0.52 0.80 0.60 0.37 0.40
PT 0.20 0.16 0.29 0.54 0.55 0.59 0.21 0.47
IT 0.20 0.31 0.47 0.70 0.55 0.61 0.39 0.41
IR 0.19 0.22 0.36 0.58 0.46 0.60 0.31 0.40
NL -0.32 0.92 0.90 0.38 0.24 0.41 0.31 0.03
GR 0.23 -0.03 0.09 0.38 0.32 0.39 0.33 0.04
Table 6: This table presents conditional rank correlations implied by a
Markov-switching Skew t − t factor copula with two common factors (lower
triangular part, based on 500000 simulations). We also display rank correla-
tions of the data (upper triangular part), where we allocate observations to
the regimes based on the smoothed probability.
to one for all government bond indices, and negative rank correlations of the government
bond indices with the financial sector index, confirming the impression from figure 2 and
being in line with our discussion of the estimated factor loadings from above. The rank
correlation matrix implied by the second regime is distinctly different, the financial index
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is still negatively correlated with the government bond indices of the three core countries,
but positively correlated with the PIIGS government bond indices. The rank correlation
between the core countries is still high, but the rank correlation between core countries and
the PIIGS countries and also between the PIIGS countries is distinctly lower than in the
first regime, that is, the government bond markets decouple with the regime change. The
rank correlations implied by the model are in general very close to the rank correlations
of the data, with notable differences mostly in the first regime for the rank correlations
of the financial sector index and the government bonds indices.
We now turn to a discussion of the quantile dependence implied by the model,
and how well this replicates the data. Figures 6 and 7 plot the quantile dependence for
q = 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.25 and q = 0.75, 0.02, ..., 0.99, respectively, for each pair of variables.
For the quantile dependence of the data we also add 95% bootstrap confidence intervals
based on 500 bootstrap samples. The quantile dependence implied by the model is usually
very close to the data, thus the Markov-switching Skew t − t factor copula model with
two common factors is able to replicate the quantile dependence structure of the data.
For some pairs of variables there appears to be a deviation for the first regime and very
small quantiles, but here one should keep the small sample size (n(1) = 171 for the first
regime) in mind. As for the rank correlations we observe distinct differences between the
two regimes: In the first regime the model implies low quantile dependence between the
financial index and the government bond indices,7 both for the lower and upper joint tails,
whereas all quantile dependence measures between the government bond indices are very
high, in fact close to the boundary for some pairs of variables. There is a mild degree of
asymmetry in the sense that dependence is higher for the lower joint tails than for the
upper joint tails for most variables. For the eight negatively dependent pairs observations
with high return for the financial sector and low return for the bond index are more likely
than observations with low return for the financial sector and high return for the bond
index. This observed asymmetry is in line with the negative estimate for the skewness
parameter for the first regime.
7Given the negative rank correlations of these eight pairs we compute the quantile dependence measures
along the counter diagonal, as described in section 2.2.
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Figure 6: This figure presents quantile dependence implied by a Markov-
switching Skew t − t factor copula model with two common factors based
on 500000 simulations (solid) and the data (dashed) for the first regime. We
also show 95% bootstrap confidence intervals based on 500 replications. We
allocate obervations based on the smoothed probability to obtain conditional
quantile dependence of the data. EMU is the Euro Area financial sector index.
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Figure 7: This figure presents quantile dependence implied by a Markov-
switching Skew t− t factor copula model with two common factors based on
500000 simulations (solid) and the data (dashed) for the second regime. We
also show 95% bootstrap confidence intervals based on 500 replications. We
allocate obervations based on the smoothed probability to obtain conditional
quantile dependence of the data. EMU is the Euro Area financial sector index.
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For the second regime we observe that quantile dependence is low between the financial
index and the government bond indices.8 The quantile dependence measures between the
government bond indices are distinctly lower than in the first regime, with highest values
for the three core countries. We do not observe any systematic asymmetry for the second
regime, in line with an insignificant skewness parameter for this regime.
5.3 Systemic risk results
We now turn to our analysis of government debt systemic risk for the Euro Area financial
sector. To this end we employ the Multi-CoVaR measure introduced in section 4.2, which
we compute using the Markov-switching Skew t−t factor copula with two common factors
from section 5.2. This model performs best among the models we compare according to
model selection criteria and we demonstrate that the model is able to replicate the rank
correlations and quantile dependence of the data. Two common factors are indicated by
a scree plot of the rank correlation matrix of our data.
We obtain total systemic risk as the ∆CoVaR when all eight government debt
markets are in distress jointly. We then employ the Shapley value methodology introduced
in section 4.4 to efficiently allocate the total systemic risk among the debt markets and
obtain the individual systemic risk contribution of each debt market, thereby accounting
for distress spillovers among these markets. Specifically, we employ the systemic risk
measure ∆CoV aRSα,t as a characteristic function for the Shapley value computation. That
is, v(S) refers to ∆CoV aRSα,t within our framework of systemic risk allocation. The
subsets S ⊆ U \ {i} of players refer to sets of government debt markets. We now turn to
a discussion of our results.
For our model, time variation in the systemic risk measures occurs because of two
reasons. First, due to time variation in the conditional distribution of the financial sector
index, that is, the conditional mean and, to a greater extent, variance. To guide the
following discussion, we display the VaR of the financial sector index in figure 8. We
observe that Euro Area financial sector VaR is particularly high at the height of the
global financial crisis around the Lehman Brothers default and again in the second half of
8For the pairs involving PIIGS bonds we now measure quantile dependence along the main diagonal
because the corresponding rank correlations are positive.
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Figure 8: This figure presents VaR of the Euro Area financial sector. α = 0.05.
2011. The second reason why time variation in the systemic risk measures occurs is due to
changes in the dependence structure, that is, regime switching in the copula. The regime
classification from the Markov-switching Skew t− t factor copula is displayed in figure 4,
with a clear regime change occurring at the height of the financial crisis, with the Lehman
Brothers default in September 2008. Section 5.2 reveals that with the regime change the
government bonds decouple and the financial index becomes positively dependent with
the indices of the PIIGS countries, whereas the government debt indices of the three core
countries, DE, FR and NL, remain negatively dependent with the fincial sector index.
Figure 9 displays the total systemic risk as well as the individual systemic risk
contributions, the Shapley values, of all sovereign debt markets over the sample period for
α = 0.05. The systemic risk measures clearly reflect the time variation in the conditional
mean and variance of the financial sector index, as measured by time variation in the
VaR: We observe that, conditional on a given regime, Shapley values and total systemic
risk are high in absolute value when financial sector VaR is high. The systemic risk
measures also clearly reflect the regime change in the dependence structure: With a short
exception in the beginning of 2008, we observe positive and very similar Shapley values
until the Lehman Brothers default. That means that the individual systemic risk impact,
while accounting for systemic risk spillovers among debt markets, is negative for each
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Figure 9: This figure displays total systemic risk (dashed) and individual
systemic risk contributions (solid) of Euro Area government debt markets for
the financial sector implied by a Markov-switching Skew t − t factor copula
model with two common factors. α = 0.05.
government debt market in a sense that distress in government debt markets reduces the
VaR of the financial sector. Importantly, government debt systemic risk changes with
the regime shift in September 2008. Shapley values of the three core countries are still
positive, and distinctly larger than prior to the regime change, with DE having the largest
value. However, the individual systemic risk impact turns negative for all PIIGS countries,
meaning that distress in these markets implies positive systemic risk for the Euro Area
financial sector, in the sense of an increased financial sector VaR when these markets
become distressed. This impact is highest shortly after the Lehman default and peaks
again in the second half of 2011, where financial sector VaR is high.
With a short exception in the beginning of 2008, the systemic risk implied by joint
distress of all eight government debt markets, as measured by ∆CoVaR based on all eight
markets or equivalently by the sum of their Shapley values, is negative until the Lehman
default, after which it turned positive. That is, joint distress of all eight debt markets
decreased financial sector VaR until the height of the financial crisis, but increased the
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financial sector VaR thereafter. Total systemic risk is highest shortly after the Lehman
Brothers default and peaked again in the second half of 2011.
In other words, a portfolio of these eight government bonds has a diversification
benefit for bank portfolios until the height of the financial crisis. This diversification
benefit is greatest during the months shortly before the Lehman default, when the financial
sector experiences heightened volatility but was is negatively dependent with all eight
government bonds. After the Lehman default a portfolio of these government bonds no
longer offers a diversification benefit on bank portfolios, but amplifies large losses.
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6 Conclusion
We study systemic government debt risk of eight major government debt markets for the
Euro Area financial sector before and after the financial crisis. To this end we employ the
Multi-CoVar measure of Cao (2013), which is a multivariate extension of the bivariate
CoVaR measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008). Multi-CoVaR is defined as the VaR
of the financial system conditional on sets instead of single financial institutions being
in distress. Multi-CoVaR can therefore explicitly account for distress spillovers among
financial institutions when determining their systemic risk impact. Efficient individual
systemic risk contributions are obtained by allocating the total systemic risk, arising from
joint distress of all institutions, through the Shapley value methodology, a concept from
game theory.
We propose to characterize Multi-CoVaR through copulas. Copula based models
are capable of describing the features often found in the dependence structure of finan-
cial assets, such as tail dependence and asymmetric dependence. Accounting for these
features is crucial for the computation of systemic risk measures that require accurately
measuring the tail risk interdependence of financial assets, such as CoVaR. Additionally,
we show that in the Multi-CoVaR context copulas provide computational advantages over
multivariate time-series models. We employ the factor copula model of Oh and Patton
(2015) for modeling the dependence structure of our data. Factor copulas are implied by
factor models and thus provide a potential dimension reduction, which is crucial when
working in high dimension. We propose to augment factor copulas by Markov-switching
dynamics to allow for time-varying dependence of government bond markets and the fi-
nancial sector. Thereby we add to the existing literature on time-varying copula models
for high-dimensional financial data.
For a sample of weekly returns on eight major sovereign bond indices and a Euro
Area financial sector index we observe a clear regime shift in the dependence structure
and systemic risk at the height of the financial crisis in September 2008, with the Lehman
Brothers default. Prior to the Lehman Brothers default we observe very strong dependence
of all bond markets as measured by very high rank correlations and quantile dependence
measures. All government bond markets are negatively dependent to the financial sector
index over this period. At the height of the financial crisis the bond markets decouple and
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the dependence of the government bond indices of the PIIGS countries with the financial
sector becomes positive. This regime shift in the dependence structure of these assets
occurring during the financial crisis is clearly reflected in systemic risk measures. Prior
to this event, we observe a negative systemic risk impact for all eight debt markets, in a
sense that distress of debt markets lowers systemic risk for the financial sector. At the
height of the financial crisis the systemic risk impact of government debt markets of the
PIIGS countries becomes positive, in a sense that distress in these markets now increases
VaR of the financial sector, whereas it remains negative for Germany, France and the
Netherlands. The systemic risk from joint distress of all eights markets is negative until
the Lehman Brothers default, but becomes positive thereafter. It is highest shortly after
the default event and again in the second half of 2011. Besides distinct time variation
we find that pronounced heterogeneity as well as tail dependence and asymmetric depen-
dence are important features of the dependence structure of these financial assets, which
a Markov-switching factor copula model with multiple fat tailed and asymmetric common
factors is able to account for.
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